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Anscombe’s Relative Bruteness
Jacob Sparks
Ethical beliefs are not justified by familiar methods. We do not directly sense 
ethical properties, at least not in the straightforward way we sense colors or shapes. 
Nor is it plausible to think – despite a tradition claiming otherwise – that there 
are self-evident ethical truths that we can know in the way we know conceptual or 
mathematical truths. Yet, if we are justified in believing anything, we are justified in 
believing various ethical propositions e.g., that slavery is wrong. If ethical beliefs are 
not justified in these familiar ways, how are they justified?
In her widely read, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” and in her short complimentary 
paper, “On Brute Facts,” G.E.M. Anscombe answers this question with a compelling 
and unorthodox account of justification in ethics. Because of her polemical tone and 
because “Modern Moral Philosophy” does so much else besides, this contribution 
is easy to overlook. But her account is worth taking seriously, since (a) it is an 
underappreciated yet plausible account that sidesteps traditional controversies, (b) 
it offers rich conceptual tools for interpreting and critiquing ethical theories, (c) it 
suggests an appealing account of the place of ethical theory in ethical knowledge and, 
(d) it provides useful guidance for doing applied ethics.
1. Relative Bruteness
G.E.M. Anscombe helped to revive virtue ethics in the English speaking world, 
made important contributions to action theory, and inspired renewed interest 
in “thick” ethical concepts.1 In this paper, I focus on a less discussed aspect of 
Anscombe’s thought which is both independent from, and sheds significant light 
on, her other achievements.2
The part of Anscombe’s view I will discuss centers on the concept of “relative 
bruteness,” a relation that holds between categories of fact. To explain the relation, 
she uses the example of ordering potatoes from a grocer: facts like «Anscombe 
ordered the potatoes,» and «the grocer delivered them,» are brute with respect 
1 See, for example, B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University 
Press, 1985.
2 The view of Anscombe’s I’m articulating is found in G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern 
Moral Philosophy,” in «Philosophy» 33 (124), January, 1958, p. 1-19 and G.E.M. Anscombe, 
“On Brute Facts,” in «Analysis» 18 (3), January, 1958, p. 69-72.
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to the fact that Anscombe owes the grocer his fee. Calling some fact brute with 
respect to others means that belief in the brute facts is sufficient to justify belief 
in the resultant fact. Disputes about resultant facts are generally settled with 
investigation into the brute facts: to decide whether Anscombe owes her grocer, 
we would consult the facts about orders and deliveries.
Anscombe sees this bruteness relation in a variety of places. A fact like 
«Anscombe made such-and-such an utterance in the presence of her grocer» is 
brute with respect to the fact that Anscombe ordered potatoes. A fact like «the 
grocer placed a sack of potatoes on Anscombe’s doorstep» is brute with respect 
to the fact that he delivered them. Facts like, «Anscombe owes her grocer,» along 
with the rest of the “owes” and “is owed” facts about Anscombe, are brute with 
respect to facts about her financial solvency. In each case, belief in one kind of 
fact is sufficient to justify belief in the other. The overall picture is of a complex 
hierarchy of thought, with many different bruteness relations holding between, 
e.g. physical facts («the grocer placed the potatoes») and sociological facts («he 
made a delivery»), sociological facts («she ordered and he delivered») and ethical 
facts («Anscombe owes her grocer»), etc.
On Anscombe’s view, belief in a brute fact can justify belief in a resultant one, 
even though the resultant fact does not always result given the brute fact. For 
example, in a case where the grocer placed a sack of potatoes on Anscombe’s 
doorstep and then arranged to have the sack taken away immediately thereafter, 
it would not be true that he delivered the potatoes. Still, believing that the grocer 
placed potatoes on Anscombe’s doorstep is sufficient to justify the belief that he 
delivered them. The belief that no such arrangement was made by the grocer is not 
required to justify the belief that he delivered the potatoes.
Call the facts that would prevent the placing of the potatoes from constituting a 
delivery defeaters, and reflect on the number and diversity of the defeaters in the case 
of the delivery. If believing that there are no defeaters were an essential part of the 
justification for believing that the grocer made a delivery, then it would be hard to know 
that the grocer made a delivery. But it is not at all hard to know that sort of thing. 
Granted, an agent who believed that the grocer delivered the potatoes on the basis of 
her belief that the grocer placed them on Anscombe’s doorstep, must not believe that a 
defeater holds. But that is not the same thing as believing, of each defeater, that it does 
not hold. Nor is it the same as believing that no defeater holds. That is why Anscombe 
does not require beliefs about the absence of defeaters to justify beliefs in resultant facts.
There is a similar point to be made about what Anscombe calls “institutions.” 
Consider all the background facts that must hold for the fact that Anscombe 
ordered and the grocer delivered to result in the fact that Anscombe owes the 
grocer his fee. If certain facts about contract, money, or customs surrounding 
payment were different, then it might not follow that Anscombe owes her grocer. 
Still, none of those institutional facts are part of the justification that she owes him 
his fee. Again, if these institutional facts were part of the justification, it would 
be difficult for anyone to know that Anscombe owes her grocer – an exceedingly 
ordinary kind of knowledge.
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In the papers mentioned, Anscombe often appears to have a metaphysical sense 
of “bruteness” in mind, where brute facts constitute or otherwise ground resultant 
facts. I am emphasizing the epistemic side of her notion3, but it is worth noting 
one metaphysical aspect of the concept I am expounding. It would be wrong to say 
that the fact, «the honest witness says Anscombe owes her grocer,» is brute with 
respect to the fact that she owes him. Though it might be reasonable to believe the 
latter on the basis of the former, knowing the testimony of the honest witness – even 
knowing that he is honest – is insufficient for knowing why she owes him his fee. 
This “knowing why” is the kind of knowledge that is involved in understanding, 
being an expert, and being in a position to teach others. As Anscombe uses the 
“bruteness” relation, brute facts do not just provide us with justification for knowing 
that the resulting facts, but for understanding, having expertise, or knowing why the 
resultant facts. This requires that the brute facts do not just justify, but also explain 
(in a way that can ground understanding) the resultant facts.
This additional aspect of bruteness will play an important role below in the 
discussion of ethical theory, and I will simply assume it from here out. But it is 
worth pausing to note that as long as you take “justification” and “knowledge” in 
the full-throated sense that includes knowing why, understanding, etc. you could 
express Anscombe’s view about bruteness as I originally did, as a thesis about one 
kind of fact being sufficient to justify another. Like Anscombe, I favor the more 
robust sense of these terms since it is knowledge and justification in this robust 
sense that we aim for when thinking about ethics. There are some non-ethical 
facts, like the fact that some medicine would be effective, where a sort of thin 
justified true belief is all we really care about (unless we are scientists aiming for the 
more robust kind of knowing). But when we investigate ethical claims, we almost 
always want to know why they are true.
We can summarize Anscombe’s account:
Relative Bruteness: Some fact, A, is brute with respect to another fact, B, when belief 
in A both explains and is sufficient to justify belief in B. Importantly, (1) B need not 
always result given A, (2) A must not include a specification of the conditions where B 
doesn’t result, and (3) A must not include a description of the “institutions” that enable 
B to result, when it does, given A.
2. Moral Regress
Anscombe introduces the bruteness relation to show what is wrong with a 
familiar reading of Hume’s remarks about “is” and “ought.” This reading implies 
3 There are key passages that invite my reading. See, e.g., “On Brute Facts” p. 71 (<<But 
I can know perfectly well that the grocer has supplied me with potatoes>> and p.72 (<<if one is 
asked to justify A, the truth of [B] is in normal circumstances an adequate justification: A is not 
verified by any further facts.>>)
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that, because you «can’t derive an “ought” from an “is,”» there must always be 
some primary ethical notion that serves to justify the rest of our ethical beliefs. If 
someone said, «Anscombe owes her grocer because she ordered and he delivered,» 
an advocate of this reading of Hume would complain that the reasoning is elliptical. 
There must be some ethical assumption like, e.g., fees are owed for orders delivered. 
Anscombe, in contrast, would call «fees are owed for orders delivered» not an 
assumption, but an institution. She would think that it is perfectly reasonable to 
believe that she owes her grocer simply on the basis of the fact that she ordered 
and he delivered.4
If Anscombe is right – if there are cases where non-ethical facts are brute with 
respect to ethical facts – then traditional debates among intuitionists, and between 
intuitionists and coherentists, are largely misguided. Under the influence of the 
Humean doctrine mentioned, these debates begin from the notion that, if an ethical 
belief is justified inferentially, the beliefs that do the justifying must include some 
primary ethical belief. Of course, these justifying ethical beliefs must themselves be 
justified. If they are justified inferentially, then there must be further ethical beliefs 
among their justifiers. A regress threatens, and disputes arise over how to avoid it.
Intuitionists claim that the chains always come to an end with an immediately 
justified ethical belief, though they disagree among themselves about the form of 
these beliefs. Some say they are highly general, self-evident ethical claims, and they 
model inquiry into these truths after mathematics.5 Others say the immediately 
justified beliefs are about what would be right in some particular circumstances, and 
they model inquiry into these after perception.6 Both groups of intuitionists disagree 
with coherentists who think the “chain” metaphor is inappropriate, preferring 
instead the image of a web, where every ethical belief is supported by others, and 
where there is no objectionable circularity in this system of mutual support.7
Anscombe, in contrast, holds that ethical beliefs may be justified by non-ethical 
beliefs alone, and thus avoids the regress entirely. She need not posit the existence 
of self-evident moral principles or a faculty of moral perception. And she avoids 
4 There is a puzzle about Anscombe’s notion of an institution. It is plausible to think that 
inferences to conclusions involving concepts like “owes” are licensed as a matter of convention. 
Thus, calling «fees are owed for ordered delivered» an institution seems appropriate. But it isn’t 
so clear in the case of concepts like “ought,” “good,” “courageous,” or “just”. Is Anscombe 
committed to a response-dependent view of the propriety of inferences involving these 
concepts? Or are we to understand her “institutions” as, at least in some cases, independent of 
our conventions?
5 See, for example, H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics. Hackett Publishing. 1981; R. 
Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence. Clarendon Press. 2003; D. Parfit, On What Matters: 
Volume Two. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 2013.
6 Examples include R. Audi, Moral Perception. Princeton University Press. 2013 and S. 
McGrath, “Moral Knowledge by Perception,” in «Philosophical Perspectives,» 2004, p. 209–28.
7 See D.O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 1989 and G. Sayre-McCord, “Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory,” 
in Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 
137-189.
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the standard objection to coherentism: that it leads to an insidious relativism by 
allowing that any system of mutually supportive ethical beliefs is justified.
On the traditional views about justification in ethics, ethical thought begins 
from pure reflection, pure observation, or the interplay between them. Anscombe’s 
position is that ethical thinking begins from beliefs about how things are, non-
ethically. Her view captures what it is like to investigate ethical questions. We 
standardly focus our attention onto some distinct class of non-ethical facts, 
passing directly from our views about the relevant non-ethical facts to an ethical 
conclusion, without the use of any well formulated moral principle. Anscombe’s 
view thus represents a plausible and largely ignored alternative to the traditional 
views about justification in ethics.8 And, as we will see below, her position has 
appealing implications for how we should do moral philosophy, both when 
constructing ethical theories and when doing applied ethics.
3. Ethical Theory
It is easy to be impressed with Anscombe’s opening claim in “Modern Moral 
Philosophy.” She writes, «[I]t is not profitable for us at present to do moral 
philosophy, [it] should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate 
philosophy of psychology.» We should not be misled by this claim into thinking 
that she has nothing useful to contribute to ethical theorizing.
In the last section, we saw how the bruteness relation can be used to characterize 
the overall relationship between ethical and non-ethical beliefs. We can also 
use the bruteness relation to better characterize and critique traditional ethical 
theories, which can be understood as views about what is brute with respect to 
what. For example, we can understand consequentialism as the view that facts 
about the value of an action’s consequences are brute with respect to facts about 
the propriety of that action.
A fully articulated version of consequentialism will also make claims about what 
is brute with respect to the facts about the value of consequences, and so the most 
obvious way to distinguish versions of consequentialism is by the facts they select 
as brute with respect to the facts about the value of consequences. If facts about 
pleasure are brute with respect to facts about the value of consequences, we have 
a hedonistic consequentialism. We could also have versions of consequentialism 
which make facts about preference satisfaction, desire satisfaction, etc. brute with 
respect to facts about the value of consequences.
One way of critiquing an ethical theory starts from the idea that, if X-facts are 
brute with respect to Y-facts, then you can’t investigate the Y-fact without a good 
8 For a more complete defense of a view resembling Anscombe’s, see J. Sparks, “Is, 
Ought, and the Regress Argument” in «Australasian Journal of Philosophy,» July 2019, p. 528-
543.
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grasp of the X-facts.9 It’s a problem for an ethical theory if our knowledge of the 
brute facts is insufficient to ground what we take to be our knowledge of the 
resultant facts. Anscombe uses this idea to attack hedonistic theories. Because she 
thinks the concept of pleasure is insufficiently clear, she doesn’t think these pleasure-
facts can be understood well enough to justify those beliefs about value that we are 
clearly justified in believing.10 And even if we did understand pleasure sufficiently 
well, there are cases where it is obvious that some consequence would be bad even 
though it isn’t at all obvious how much pleasure or pain attends that consequence.11
There are additional ways to distinguish versions of consequentialism. It is 
common to pick out a specific subset of the facts about the value of consequences 
as brute with respect to the facts about the propriety of actions. For instance, 
Anscombe thinks that, if any facts about consequences are brute with respect 
to facts about the propriety of an action, they are only facts about the intended 
consequences of that action. Another way to critique an ethical theory, then, is to 
show that it postulates irrelevant facts as brute with respect to some class of ethical 
facts. Anscombe thus criticizes traditional consequentialist views for including, 
among the facts that are brute with respect to facts about the propriety of actions, 
facts about the unintended consequences of those actions.
Different versions of consequentialism can also be distinguished by the structure 
of the bruteness relation connecting facts about the value of consequences to 
facts about the propriety of actions. A direct consequentialist would think that, 
in attempting to discover the facts about the propriety of actions, you must 
investigate directly into the value of the consequences. In contrast, a virtue-theoretic 
consequentialist would think that, in attempting to discover the facts about the 
propriety of actions, you first have to discover if those actions are courageous, 
cowardly, generous, kind, or just and that the correct method for doing this will 
9 This principle is controversial, since beliefs may have multiple sources of justification. 
So even if X-facts are brute with respect to Y-facts, we might be able to know the Y-facts in 
some other way. The requirement that brute facts explain resultant facts in a way that grounds 
understanding may partially mitigate this worry, as it is plausible to think that facts have only one 
understanding-grounding explanation. Thanks to Dallas Amico for pressing this point.
10 A critique with the same basic structure is the reason Anscombe claims that we can’t 
do moral philosophy without advances in our philosophy of psychology. As we’ll see below, 
Anscombe thinks that the most important ethical facts are facts about virtue and that certain facts 
supplied by the philosophy of psychology are required for saying anything helpful about what’s 
brute with respect to facts about virtue. For instance, the distinction between intended and 
unintended consequences – a distinction Anscombe sees as problematic and poorly understood 
– is essential for characterizing the difference between conscientiousness and kindness. So 
any progress in learning about these virtue-facts, about which actions are conscientious and 
which are kind, will have to wait for resolution of certain psychological-facts that, according to 
Anscombe, remain obscure.
11 A similar complaint can also be lodged against the consequentialist’s claim that facts 
about the value of consequences are brute with respect to facts about the propriety of actions. 
Intuitively, we may know that some acts are right or wrong without knowing the value of their 
consequences.
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ultimately require investigation into facts about the value of consequences.12 Both 
views agree that the value of consequences are, in some sense, brute with respect 
to the propriety of actions.13 But there is a more important sense in which they 
disagree. Only virtue-theoretic consequentialism – a view plausibly ascribed to 
Mill and Sidgwick – posits additional structure, claiming that facts about the value 
of consequences are brute with respect to virtue facts which are, in turn, brute with 
respect to facts about the propriety of actions. Virtue-theoretic consequentialism 
thus gives an essential role to “thick” moral terms. A wide variety of virtue-
theoretic consequentialist views could be distinguished by the specific thick terms 
they select as brute with respect to the facts about what is right.
Anscombe would not accept the idea that what is brute with respect to facts 
employing thick terms are just facts about the value of consequences. But her more 
profound disagreement with the virtue-theoretic consequentialist is over the claim 
that facts about virtue are brute with respect to facts about what is right. She does 
not think any facts are brute with respect to facts about what is right. She writes: 
«It would be a great improvement if instead of “morally wrong” we always named 
a genus like “untruthful,” “unchaste,” “unjust.” We should no longer ask whether 
doing something was “wrong,” passing directly from some description of an action 
to this notion; we should ask whether, e.g. it was unjust, and the answer would 
sometimes be clear at once». (“Modern Moral Philosophy,” p. 8-9)
Anscombe recommends against using a concept like “right action.” Concepts like 
“morally right” and “morally wrong,” she claims, have survived in a corrupted sense 
outside the context that made them intelligible.14 Even if Anscombe were mistaken 
about the historical context of “right,” it is still exceedingly difficult to say anything 
useful about what’s brute with respect to what’s right. A more tractable problem – 
the one Anscombe thinks is reasonable to pursue – would involve theorizing about 
what is brute with respect to what is truthful, chaste, just, etc.15
12 Virtue-theoretic consequentialism bears some resemblance to rule-consequentialism. 
The difference is that rule-consequentialism is usually understood to provide an analysis of right 
action in terms of the action’s accordance with rules that, if adopted, would maximize the value 
of consequences. Virtue-theoretic consequentialism, in contrast, is a theory about how beliefs 
about what’s right are justified.
13 Strictly speaking, virtue-theoretic consequentialism doesn’t hold that facts about the 
value of consequences are brute with respect to facts about the propriety of actions. Relative 
bruteness is not a transitive relation. Still, if X is brute with respect to Y, and Y is brute with 
respect to Z, there is some important relationship between X and Z.
14 For an Anscombe-inspired defense of this claim, see A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A 
Study in Moral Theory, Third Edition, University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.
15 Virtue theory is sometimes characterized as offering an analysis of “right action” in 
terms of what a virtuous person would do. See, for example, R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 
Vol. 2. Oxford University Press, 1999; R. Stangl, “Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism,” in 
«Ethics» 121 (1), October, 2010, p. 37–57; F. Svensson, “Virtue Ethics and the Search for an 
Account of Right Action,” in «Ethical Theory and Moral Practice» 13 (3), June, 2010, p. 255-
271; and C, Swanton, “A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action.” in «Ethics» 112 (1), October, 
2001, p. 32-52. It’s remarkable that anyone who traces the origins of modern virtue theory to 
Anscombe would adopt this view, since she clearly wishes to do away with the concepts like 
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We have seen that ethical theories can be expressed as views about what is brute 
with respect to what, and that the ambition of many traditional ethical theories – like 
versions of consequentialism – is to trace these bruteness relations, starting from 
some well-defined class of non-ethical facts and ending at facts about what’s right 
or wrong. Anscombe casts doubt on these stories from both ends. She is generally 
suspicious of the specific classes of non-ethical facts from which these stories start. 
And she does not think you can say what is brute with respect to anything more 
general than the facts about what is unjust, unchaste, or untruthful. But that does 
not mean that nothing useful can be said about what is brute with respect to what. 
If we keep a sufficiently open mind about what non-moral facts might be relevant, 
we can make progress thinking about what is brute with respect to the facts about 
things like justice, chastity, and truthfulness. Tracing these more modest bruteness 
relations is – on Anscombe’s view – the only productive way to theorize about ethics.
4. Ethical Knowledge
Anscombe’s view also suggests an answer to the question about the role of 
ethical theory in ethical knowledge. On the standard intuitionist view, knowledge 
of particular ethical facts, like what would be good or just in a specific situation, 
depends on the application of an ethical theory. Ethical theories, on this view, are 
the necessary foundation for the rest of our ethical knowledge. On the perceptual 
intuitionist view, knowledge of particular ethical facts is obtained via a sensory 
or perceptual capacity, and ethical theories are derived by generalizing over our 
knowledge of particulars. Ethical theories, on this view, are the culmination of the 
rest of our ethical knowledge. Coherentist views put particular ethical beliefs and 
ethical theories on a par. The justification of each kind of belief depends on its 
coherence with the rest of what we believe about ethics.
All three of these views have in common the notion that there is some dependence 
(in one direction, the other, or both) between our knowledge of ethical theories and 
our knowledge of particular ethical facts. Anscombe’s picture is radically different in 
that it does not require any such dependence. Particular ethical beliefs can be justified 
by relevant non-ethical facts. Ethical theories can be justified by relevant non-ethical 
facts. Neither kind of ethical belief is required for the justification of the other.
There is an important difference between general ethical claims and theoretical 
ones. You might believe, for example, that it is unkind to throw hot coffee at fellow 
cafe patrons. The general ethical claim, «it’s unkind to throw hot coffee,» would 
not qualify as an ethical theory, despite its generality. If we were looking for the 
non-ethical facts that are brute with respect to «it’s unkind to throw hot coffee,”» 
we might find general non-ethical claims like, «throwing hot coffee causes pain 
“right action.” For a defense of Anscombe’s eliminativism about “right,” see J. Hacker-Wright, 
“Virtue Ethics without Right Action: Anscombe, Foot, and Contemporary Virtue Ethics.” in 
«The Journal of Value Inquiry» June 1, 2010, p 209-224.
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and distress.» An ethical theory, in contrast, is not just a general ethical claim, but 
a general claim about the bruteness relations obtaining between some ethical and 
non-ethical facts. Thus, the claim «causing pain and distress is unkind,» might 
plausibly be interpreted as a theory of unkindness.
To understand which non-ethical facts might be brute with respect to claims 
like, «causing pain and distress is unkind,» recall the notion of a defeater from §1. 
Even though the fact that some act causes pain and distress is brute with respect to 
the fact that it is unkind, there may be cases where causing pain and distress is not 
unkind. For example, someone may consent to the pain and distress, or the pain 
and distress might be required for some greater good, etc. On Anscombe’s view, 
you do not need to know that there are no defeaters in order to know that some 
act is unkind on the basis of your belief that it causes pain and distress. But this 
is compatible with thinking that general facts about the absence of defeaters are 
required to be justified in believing the ethical theory that claims causing pain and 
distress is unkind. In particular, the fact that people generally don’t consent to pain 
and distress, or that pain and distress aren’t usually required for achieving some 
important greater good, are the kinds of facts that could be brute with respect to 
our theory about unkindness – the theory that says facts about pain and distress 
are brute with respect to facts about unkindness. In general, ethical theories can be 
justified by non-ethical beliefs about the absence of defeaters.
One implication of this view is that ethical theory is more difficult than everyday 
ethical reasoning. Both particular and general ethical beliefs – that it is unkind in 
this case to throw the coffee or that it is generally unkind to throw coffee – can 
be justified by relatively mundane non-ethical beliefs – that throwing coffee in this 
case would cause pain and distress or that throwing coffee generally causes pain and 
distress. But the ethical theory that asserts that facts about pain and distress are brute 
with respect to facts about unkindness requires a more complicated story about the 
general absence of defeaters. Since no pithy description of the defeaters for particular 
bruteness relations is forthcoming, ethical theory, on Anscombe’s view, is hard.
5. Applied Ethics
Anscombe’s view about justification makes ethical theorizing independent 
from, and more challenging than, everyday ethical reasoning. Her view also has 
implications for how to do applied ethics. The most important contrast with 
traditional approaches is that applied ethics is never, for Anscombe, the application 
of an ethical theory to some particular situation. If you want to investigate specific 
applied questions about, e.g., capital punishment or abortion, the best you can do 
is to learn about the relevant non-ethical facts that are brute with respect to the 
ethical facts in question.
This may seem to be an unpalatable implication of Anscombe’s view. It is common 
to imagine situations where, though we agree on all the non-ethical facts, we disagree 
about the ethical implications. It is also easy to imagine situations where, though you 
know all the relevant non-ethical facts, you remain stumped about the ethical facts. 
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In such cases, it is often thought that an appeal to an ethical theory, or to consistency 
with other ethical beliefs, is the best method for investigating or resolving the dispute. 
Without this appeal to theory or consistency, Anscombe’s view seems to lack the 
resources that would allow us to make progress in these situations.
Anscombe’s position on applied ethics is considerably more attractive 
than it initially appears. Recall the distinction made in §1 between a thin kind 
of knowledge and a more robust kind that includes knowledge-why and 
understanding. Anscombe’s view, that the only way to investigate an ethical 
question is to investigate the relevant non-ethical facts, will appear more plausible 
if we remember that there is a wide variety of knowledge-like relations we can bear 
to the relevant non-ethical facts.
Imagine, for example, that we are trying to think about the propriety of some 
particular abortion. Among the relevant brute facts are facts about what it is like 
to be the fetus, mother, and others involved, facts about the larger social effects, 
facts about the action-type this abortion falls under, etc. One might know that the 
abortion would be emotionally difficult but ultimately beneficial to the mother. 
That’s a relatively thin kind of knowledge, which could be supplemented with an 
understanding of the feelings involved, of what it would be like to carry the fetus to 
term, of what it would be like to abort, of the felt impact, either way, to the mother, 
potential child, and any others involved, etc.
The charge that knowing the brute non-ethical facts can still leave us guessing 
about the resultant ethical facts is, at least in part, a piece of philosophical fiction. 
Anscombe’s view invites us to look more closely at the relevant non-ethical facts, to 
understand them in a more profound way, and to always return again to reexamine, 
redescribe, and reassess them when we remain uncertain about the resultant ethical 
facts. Her view is a welcome correction to the tendency to approach applied issues 
by finding a preferred theory, “applying” it to the case at hand, and ignoring other 
factors deemed irrelevant.
There are a number of writers who have defended views resembling Anscombe’s.16 
Nevertheless, the position remains marginal. But perhaps this will change, given 
the usefulness of her notion of “bruteness” and the appealing implications of the 
thesis that non-ethical facts are brute with respect to ethical facts.
Jacob Sparks
University of California, San Diego, U.S.A.
jacob.sparks@gmail.com
16 Examples include J.J. Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Wiley. 1996 
and M.T. Nelson 2003. “Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? (Dedicated to the Memory of 
R.M. Chisholm, 1916–1999).” in «Argumentation» 17 (1), March, 2003, p. 35-42. Zimmerman 
discusses a view like Anscombe’s sympathetically in A. Zimmerman, Moral Epistemology, 
Routledge. 2010. Though he focuses on explanation and not justification, Berker presents a 
similar view in S. Berker, “The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles.” in «Noûs» 
December 2019, p. 904-936.
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